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Abstract-A detailed, analytic model is developed to represent the duel between a 
ground laser designator (GLD) directing a sequence of laser-guided rounds against a 
platoon of target tanks which counterfire against the GLD. The model accurately por- 
trays the complex interplay between the designator-on time, the rate of fire of the laser- 
guided rounds, and the tank counterfire response time distributions. Also taken into 
account are the tank aiming errors and range estimating techniques. the level of GLD 
protection, flight times, designation modes, and degree of coordination of the tank 
platoon. 
One of the innovations of this model is the utilization of gamma distributions to 
represent tank counter-fire response times. This permits the representation of the time- 
to-fire for any number of tank rounds within the designator-on time interval by con- 
volution of the gamma density functions. Exact expressions which allow for all en- 
counter outcomes are derived for computation of the expected number of tanks killed 
and probability of GLD kill. 
This model was used to determine the probabilistic outcomes of the encounters at 
each stage of the force-on-force analysis in the definitive U.S. Army study on GLD 
survivability. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The development of laser-guided missiles and projectiles has provided a new dimension 
to the battlefield environment for tanks. From a remote ground or airborne forward ob- 
server (FO) position, a laser designator operator illuminates a target tank with a directed 
laser beam (see Fig. I). The laser energy reflected from this spot on the target then enables 
the seeker to guide the missile/projectile to the target tank. If able to detect the presence 
of the laser designation, the tank (and its support units) may use various countermeasures 
(CM), such as taking evasive action, using smoke or chaff to disguise the tank’s position, 
generating false target images to deceive the missile seeker, dazzling the FO with flash- 
lamps, and/or directing counterfire against the FO, the missile launching platform, or the 
missile itself. This report presents a rigorous analysis of the Tank Counterfire Duel, in 
which laser-guided missiles are directed against a tank or tank platoon via a ground laser 
designator (GLD), and the tanks detect the laser radiation and counter by tiring their main 
guns in an effort to destroy the GLD. 
The analytic model which will be derived takes into account tank counterfire response 
time distributions, designator-on times, tank-to-GLD range, missile/projectile single-shot 
kill probabilities (SSKP), tank round SSKP against the GLD, tank fire control errors, 
GLD protection, ground slope at the GLD, missile and projectile flight times and rates 
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of fire, tank round flight times, and degrees of coordination of the tank platoon. Special 
features which make this model unique include the following: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Probability distributions are derived to represent tank times-to-fire. In particular, 
gamma density functions are fit to the times-to-first-fire and time-between-fires 
data. The time-to-nth-fire distribution is then obtained by convolution of the time- 
to-first-fire density with n-l copies of the time-between-fires density. 
Any number of tank fires are allowed during the designator-on time interval. 
Flight time of the tank round is included. 
Various GLD positions and protection levels are considered. 
Analytic expressions which incorporate the time-to-fire distributions and allow 
for all encounter outcomes are formulated for computation of the expected num- 
ber of tanks killed and probability of GLD kill. This is not a simulation model! 
In addition to the one round versus one tank duel, the encounter between three 
laser-guided rounds versus a platoon of three tanks is analyzed, with attention 
paid to the level of coordination of the tanks. 
The data base used for the model was derived from the totality of U.S. Army field 
experiments on tank counter-fire response and GLD kill. Most of these data cannot be 
detailed in this paper due to classification, but the form of the data will be discussed. 
GLD suppression, that is, degradation in GLD crew performance due to counterfire near- 
misses and obscuration, could not be included due to a lack of proper experimental data, 
even though the model could be adapted to handle suppression. 
Because of Congressional concern over the survivability of ground laser designators 
on the battlefield, a special task force, the Survivability Study Task Force for Ground 
Laser Designators (SSTF), was established to answer the survivability question once and 
for all. The SSTF performed a two-stage analysis of the physical survivability of the GLD. 
First, the model described in this paper was used to provide a detailed analysis of the 
outcomes of counterfire duels played under a wide variety of conditions. These duels 
were then placed in a realistic battlefield context as the fixed-piece engagements occurring 
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in a force-on-force map exercise pitting one Blue company on the defense against a Red 
tank threat. The resulting battlefield engagement assessment’ provided a thorough and 
credible answer to the GLD survivability question, which has been cited frequently in 
Congressional testimony. In addition to the duel between one laser-guided round and one 
tank (l-on-l) and the encounter between three rounds fired in sequence and a platoon of 
three tanks (3-on-j) discussed in this paper, models for other encounter combinations 
were derived’ for use in the SSTF map exercise. 
II. PROBLEM VARIABLES 
The essence of the encounter situation is best understood from the following parameters 
essential to the analysis. 
Designator-tank range 
For survivability reasons, the operator of the laser designator would prefer to operate 
at as great a distance from the tanks as possible, because the greater the range the less 
effective are the tank rounds counterfired against the GLD. However, there is an upper 
limit on this range imposed by the ability to hold the laser spot on the tank, particularly 
when the tank is moving. Also terrain conditions will often determine when the on-coming 
tank can first be designated. Consequently, a number of different designator-to-tank ranges 
are treated in this study. 
Missilelprojectile launch range 
The flight time of the missile may affect the length of time the GLD must designate 
the target, if the target is illuminated for the entire missile flight. This is not the case for 
projectiles where laser designation is required only for the terminal part of the trajectory. 
Tank response time 
The time from laser alarm until the tank fires its first round, then a second round, then 
a third, etc, is one of the two critical time factors in the tank counterfire duel. The longer 
the tank response time, the more survivable the GLD. Time-to-first-fire and time-between- 
fires have been measured in various field tests, and probability distributions are fit to 
these data as the model is developed. 
Designator-on time 
The other critical time factor is the length of time that the target tank is illuminated 
by the GLD. The tradeoff between this time and the tank response time is the essence 
of the Counter-fire Duel, .for long designator-on times decrease the survivability of the 
GLD. The designator-on time may be reduced by special techniques such as offset des- 
ignation, in which the GLD beams on a nearby object which reflects laser energy but 
does not trigger the tank’s laser alarm, then switches to the tank in the final critical 
guidance phase of the weapon trajectory. 
’ Thomas J. Gleason, Joseph V. Michalowicz. Morgan G. Smith, and Richard Scungio, Final Report- 
Survivability Study Task Force for Ground Laser Designators, Harry Diamond Laboratories, HDL-TR-1860 
(December 1982). 
’ Joseph V. Michalowicz, Analysis of the Laser-Guided Missile/Projectile versus Tank Countertire Duel, 
Harry Diamond Laboratories, HDL-TR-1854 (May 1978). 
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Single-shot kill probability (SSKP) for the laser-guided round against the tank 
This parameter is of obvious importance and varies from one laser-guided weapon to 
another. 
SSKP for tank round against laser designator 
This parameter depends on the type of tank round fired, the tank-to-GLD range, the 
hardness of the FO position [e.g., in a foxhole, a bunker, or a forward observer vehicle 
(FOV)], and the ground slope at the GLD. The SSKP is also affected by the fire control 
and resulting aiming errors of the tank gun, which depend on whether the tank comes to 
a stop or fires on the move and whether the tank determines range visually or by means 
of a laser rangefinder. Permanent kill of the GLD is accomplished by either destroying 
the laser designator or disabling both the GLD operator and observer; temporary kill 
includes the additional possibility of disabling only the operator. 
Flight time of tank round 
This parameter is determined by the type of round fired and the distance from the tank 
to the GLD. Since this time is nonzero, the possibility exists in the l-on-l duel that both 
the tank and the GLD will be killed. 
Coordination of tank platoon 
In the case of multiple missiles fired against a tank platoon, the degree to which the 
tanks in the platoon can alert their companion tanks when they are being designated may 
be a major factor in the outcome of the counter-fire duel. 
Time between missile fires 
The time interval between successive laser-guided missile launches must be coordinated 
with the GLD operator and is dependent on the speed with which he can evaluate missile 
hit or miss and switch to the next target. It is expected that two or three missiles may be 
in flight simultaneously against a tank platoon. 
To analyze the missile versus tank duel, the following exchange ratio is an appropriate 
performance measure: 
ER = 
Expected number of tanks killed 
Probability of GLD kill by tank counterfire * 
In the one missile versus one tank duel, this exchange ratio may be simplified to 
ER = 
Probability of tank kill 
Probability of GLD kill by tank counterfire ’ 
(1) 
(2) 
This performance measure provides a comparative description of the outcome of the 
missile-versus-tank encounter: large values of ER are favorable to the missile/GLD sys- 
tem, small values favorable to the tank. Note that a direct cost-effectiveness comparison 
would be difficult to formulate in this analysis, because the GLD bears a much greater 
significance than its actual unit cost since it is an essential part of an expensive weapon 
system. 
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Various field tests have been conducted over the years to measure the rapidity with 
which a tank crew can recognize and fire upon a target which suddenly threatens the tank. 
Representative of the data chosen to portray these tank counterfire response times are 
the histograms in Figure 2, which depicts times for the tank to tire its first round (left- 
hand histogram) and times between fires (right-hand histogram). 
In the past, lognormal distributions were selected to fit such tank response time data. 
However, since the objective is to develop a tank counterfire model which is as realistic 
as possible, the tank must be permitted any number of counterfires during the designator- 
on period: that is, the number of rounds the tank can fire at the GLD will be limited only 
by the time in which the tank has to fire, and not by any arbitrary limit imposed to simplify 
the derivation of the relevant mathematical formulas. We shall see that this flexibility is 
not in consonance with the use of lognormal fits to the histograms. 
We introduce the notation 
t, = time to nth tank fire, 
At = time between tank fires. 
Suppose a suitable probability density function f(t,) has been fit to the time-to-first-fire 
histogram and a density function g(At) to the time-between-fires histogram. Under the 
assumption that the time-from-first-fire-to-second-fire distribution also represents that 
between any two successive fires, the time to the (k + 1)st fire, for any k 2 1, may be 
written 
fk+l = ?] + At + ‘.. + At. 
v 
k independent choices of AI 
Since addition of random variables corresponds to convolution of their probability density 
functions, the density function for tk+, is then given by the k-fold convolution 
f(fk+,) = f(r,) * ,o(At) * ... * g(At). 
. Y / 
k times 
(3) 
Each of these convolutions requires an integration, and so the problem appears to become 
computationally complicated beyond about 4 shots. The situation would be tractable if 
the distribution of At were reproductive (a distribution is defined to be reproductive if 
the sum of independent random variables each with such a distribution is a random variable 
which again has such a distribution). The normal distribution is a well-known reproductive 
distribution; however, this distribution does not have the proper shape to fit typical tank 
response-time histograms. 
Finding a reproductive distribution to fit the time-between-fires histogram is crucial to 
the development of the present model; suitable candidate distributions are examined in 
Table 1. The moment-generating functions are listed because the usual proof of repro- 
ductivity proceeds by showing that the moment-generating function for the sum of two 
independent random variables with the same type of distribution, which is the product of 
their two moment-generating functions, again corresponds to a distribution of that same 
type. In fact it turns out that the gamma, lognormal, and Rayleigh distributions all fit time- 
between-fires data reasonably well, but the lognormal and Rayleigh distributions are not 
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Figure 2. Typical Tank Response Time Data 
reproductive. The gamma distribution is not in general reproductive, but this distribution 
is reproductive in the special case of repeated addition of a random variable to itself, And 
this is exactly the case here, where various values of At are summed. 
Gamma distributions, fit to the tank response time data, then enable us to determine 
the density functions for tk+ ,, for k 5 1, with a single convolution. With the notation 
f(t,) = fhLTJfl) 
AAt) = fi.v,(At) 
to denote the density functions of such gamma distributions, we can express the density 
functions for tk+ , as 
f(k+,> = f(t,) * g(At) * ... * g(At) 
\ / 
Y 
k times 
= fh,.,,,(t,) * f&kAf) 
because of the partial reproductivity of the gamma distribution. Therefore, we have the 
formula 
f(h+ 1) = [+’ f~,.,,(f,>fm,(t~+, - II) df, (4) 
foreachkz 1. 
The parameters A and -q of the gamma distribution fits to the response time histograms 
are obtained by equating q/h to the test data mean and q/h* to the test data variance. In 
this way the following gamma distribution fits are derived: 
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(1) time-to-first-fire 
A, = 0.269 
ni = 5.262 
f(t,) = (2.783 x 10-s)t~.‘6’ exp(-0.269t,). 
This fit passes the chi-square test, since a value of 
x* = 4.33 
is calculated with 3 degrees of freedom, which compares favorably with the critical value 
at the j-percent level (type I error) 
X: = 7.815. 
(2) time-between-tires 
h = 0.3273 
rt = 5.204 
g(At) = (9.123 x 10-5)At4~204 exp(-0.3273At). 
This fit also passes the chi-square test, at least at the 2-percent level. These gamma 
distribution fits are shown in Figs. 3 and 4. 
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Figure 3. Gamma distribution fit to first-round histogram. 
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Figure 4. Gamma distribution fit to between-rounds histogram. 
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Figure 5. Probability density for time-to-first-fire 
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Figure 6. Probability density for time-to-second-fire 
Substitution of the gamma distribution parameters into equation (4) then gives the 
formulas for the time-to-nth-fire probability densities: 
f(t,) = (2.783 x 10-s)t~.26’ exp( -0.269t1) 
f(tk+ ,) = (2.783 x 10-5)(0.00299)k exp( -0.3273tk, ,) 
(5) 
/ 
Ik:c I 
t?262 
(tx-+ I - fl F204k - ’ 
0 r(5.204k) 
exp(O.O583t,) dt, (6) 
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Figure 7. Probability density for time-to-third-fire 
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Figure 8. Probability density for time-to-fourth-fire 
Graphs of some of these time-to-nth-fire probability density functions are presented in 
Figs. 5-9. 
IV. TANK COUNTERFIRE MODELS 
With the tank response time distributions derived in the previous section, analytic 
models can now be developed for the l-on-l duel and the 3-on-3 encounter. Formulas 
will be given expressing the probability of GLD destruction and the expected number of 
tanks killed in each encounter. Any number of tank counter-fires may occur during the 
designator-on time and the flight time of the tank round is explicitly considered. Coor- 
dination of counter-fire from the tank platoon is also treated. 
Several ground rules are established in developing the model, although different as- 
sumptions could be readily incorporated. Line-of-sight between the GLD and the tank is 
0.030 
r 
TIME-to-Sth-FIRE, t$(s) 
Figure 9. Probability density for time-to-fifth-fire 
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maintained throughout the duel encounter: this is not unrealistic, especially when the tank 
or tanks stop to fire. If the tank laser alarm system is operating properly, it is assumed 
to detect the existence of the laser spot as soon as the tank is illuminated (if there were 
a known lag time, it would be subtracted from the designator-on time). Once the laser 
alarm sounds, the tank crew is assumed to devote full attention to defeating the GLD 
rather than pursuing its original mission. If the tank destroys the GLD, the laser-guided 
round is rendered harmless to the tank. Suppression is not played, so tank rounds which 
miss the GLD do not disturb the GLD operator’s illumination of the tank target and hence 
do not disrupt the operation of the laser-guided weapon system. Tanks may fire either at 
a stop or on the move, and they may adjust their aim between rounds; these possibilities 
can be handled by using the appropriate SSKP data. The assumption that the tanks fire 
at the GLD only during the designator-on time serves as the end-of-game criterion. 
One-on-one duel 
The duel between a single laser-guided missile directed against an individual tank by 
a GLD, with that tank counterfiring against the GLD, will be treated first. The following 
notation will be needed to express the resulting probability formulas: 
T, = 
= 
Tz = 
PD = 
P TK = 
P GK = 
P” = 
= 
P,* = 
= 
designator-on time 
time from laser alarm to missile hit 
flight time of tank-fired round 
probability that the tank detects the laser designation and fires at the GLD 
SSKP by laser-guided missile 
SSKP by tank round 
probability that the tank fires the nth round in T, seconds 
Prob (t, % T,) 
probability that the tank fires the nth round ii; T, - Tz seconds 
Prob (f, 5 T, - Tz) 
Since the tank round is unguided after fire, both the tank and the GLD could be destroyed 
if the tank fires a round at the GLD less than T2 seconds before missile hit. It is for this 
reason that the distinction between P, and P,* is drawn. 
The formulas which govern the l-on-l duel may be written as follows: 
P= Prob (tank killed by missile) 
= 
Q= 
P TK 
[ 
1 - PDP: + PD 5 (P,* - P,*i ,)(l - PGK)” 
n=l 1 
Prob (GLD killed by tank) 
= 
PDPGK c P,(l - PG,$-’ 
?I=1 
ER = 
P 
e 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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Formula (7) for tank kill is derived by expressing the event that the tank is killed by the 
laser-guided missile as a sum of disjoint events. where the nth term in the summation 
corresponds to the event in which the tank has fired exactly n rounds (all missing) before 
being destroyed by the missile. Likewise, formula (8) for GLD kill is constructed from a 
sum of disjoint events, with the nth term in the summation representing the event in which 
the tank fires n rounds before missile hit and the nth round is the one that destroys the 
GLD. The exchange ratio ER is then given by the quotient of these two probabilities. 
Three missiles versus tank platoon 
Derivation of the probability formulas is considerably more complex for the counter-fire 
scenario of three laser-guided missiles rapid-fired under the control of one GLD against 
a platoon of three tanks. In this case the GLD switches to another tank upon tank kill 
and two or three missiles may be in the air at one time in an attack sequence. An important 
factor in the analysis of this scenario is the degree to which the tanks can alert their 
companion tanks to the presence of the laser designator. Two cases will be considered: 
an uncoordinated platoon and a perfectly coordinated platoon. The following notation, 
which extends that used for the one-on-one duel, will be needed in developing the formulas 
(T denotes a time variable): 
P,,(T) = probability of nth tank fire in T seconds 
P,*(T) = probability of nth tank fire in T - T2 secon,!s 
P*(T) = probability that all tank rounds fired in T - T2 seconds miss 
= 1 - P,P;(T) + PD 5 [P,*(T) - Pd_ ,(T)]( I - Pc;KY 
n = I 
P(T) = probability that all tank rounds fired in T seconds miss 
= 1 - PDF',(T) + PD I: [P,(T) - P,,+I(T)I(~ - PGKY 
tl=I 
Q(T) = probability that the tank fires a GLD-killing round in T seconds 
= PDPGK i: Pn(T)(I - PGK)"-' 
??=I 
Q*(T) = probability that the tank fires a GLD-killing round in T - Tz seconds 
= PDPGK 5 P,*(T)(l - PGK)~-’ 
?7=I 
T3 = length of time that GLD illuminates companion tanks 
T4 = time between missile arrivals 
T5 = companion tank reaction time delay 
Ptn = probability that i tanks are killed 
Q = probability that GLD is killed 
Q”’ = probability that GLD is killed and i tanks are killed 
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pen - Q’j’ = probability that GLD survives and i tanks are killed, 
and that if there are m target tanks (e.g., m = 3 for a tank platoon), then 
-$ p(n = 1, 
i=o 
2 Q(i) = Q, 
i=o 
E = expected number of tanks killed = 5 iP(” 
i=O 
T1 will now be interpreted as the time from laser alarm of the first tank designated to the 
arrival of the first missile, to be consistent with the usage of the l-on-l duel. It is easily 
shown that for any value of T 
f’(T) + Q(T) = 1 
P*(T) + Q*(T) = 1. 
The convention is adopted that P*(T) = 1 and Q*(T) = 0 when T < Tz. 
Uncoordinated tank platoon 
First, suppose the designated tanks do not, or are unable to, alert companion tanks in 
the platoon to the presence of the GLD. In this case, the tanks counterfire only upon 
being designated themselves, so the logical GLD strategy is to beam on a tank until it is 
killed, then switch to the next tank and designate it for T3 seconds before the impact of 
the next missile. The time, T4, between missile fires has to allow for this switching time. 
If a missile misses its intended target, the GLD still maintains its designation of the target 
tank m:tead of switching to another tank at this point, because switching would incur 
counterfire from another tank in addition to the continued counterfire from the tank orig- 
inally designated. The game ends when the last missile reaches its target; the GLD switches 
off and no further tank rounds are fired (however, the effect of a tank round alre: dy in 
flight is included). 
The equations governing this situation are presented in Fig. 10. The assumption is made 
that the time between missile arrivals is greater than the flight time of the tank round; 
that is 
This assumption is valid in most tank counterfire cases. Modifications have to be made 
to the formulas if this inequality is reversed; such formulas are included in another report.3 
’ Joseph V. Michalowicz, Analysis of the Laser-Guided Maverick versus Tank Counterfire Duel. Harry 
Diamond Laboratories, HDL-TR-1909 (June 1980). 
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Each of the formulas in Fig. 10 is derived from a sum of disjoint events as for the I- 
on-l duel, but it is clear that the complexity of the formulas has greatly increased in the 
multiple missile/multiple tanks case. We choose one example, say the formula for P”‘. 
to show how these equations are derived. Now P”’ is the probability that exactly one 
tank is killed; the disjoint events and their corresponding probabilities, which add up to 
give the formula for Pi’, are shown in Fig. 11. 
Prob (3 tanks killed) 
P(TI )P( T3)P*(r,)P:K 
Prob (exactly 2 tanks killed) 
P(T,){[Q(Tj) - Q*(T,)l + P(T,)[t - P*(TMTKI~& 
+ P(T,)P*(T, + I-4)( I - PTh.)PIK + P(T, + TJ)P”(T,)(I - PTKVCK 
Prob (exactly one tank killed) 
[Q(T,) - Q*(T,)IPx + P(T,){Q*(73) + [Q’(~J + T,) - Q*(T,)l(l - ~‘TK) 
+ P*(Ts + T,)(I - Prh.)‘}Pr~ + [Q(7-, + Td) - Q*(T, + T,)l(l - PTK)PTK 
+ P(TI + T4)[l - P*(T,)PXI(I - PX)PTK 
7 
+ P*(T, + ZTJ)( I - Pr,q)-PrI; 
Prob (no tanks killed) 
Q= 
= 
Q*(r,, + [Q”(T, + r,) - Q*(71)l(l - PTK) 
+ [Q*(T, + 27.4) - Q*(T, + Td)](I - Px)’ + P*(T, + 7Tj)(l - Pr,v)’ 
Prob (GLD killed) 
Q”’ = 
Q(” = 
f3rIw3)Q(r2)~+K + P(r,)cQcr,) + [Qu-> + r,) - Qudicl - hwTK 
+ P(rI + rdQ(r,)(l - P~IOP~~ + Q(rI) + [Qu, + rd - Qcr,)l(i - h) 
+ cQ(rI + zrd - Qcr, + rdl(i - hdZ 
P(r,)PTKP(r3;)Pr.K[Q(r3) - Q*(rdh 
p(r,)PTKP(r3)PTK(Q*(r,) + (I - PTK)[Q(r3) - Q*(rdi) 
f P(r~hd~~[Q(rd - Q*(TJ)i + P(TI)PT~I - hvh[Q(TJ + r4) 
- c2*u3 + rd1 
Q(" = 
+ (I - hmr, + rJwwMQ~r3~ - Qvdl 
PTKoQ(TI) - Q*(r,,l + P(rl)Q*u3) 
+ orI)(i - h)[Q*(r, + 7-d - Q*(r,)i 
+ p(T,)(i - h)TQ(r3 + rd - Q*cr3 + rdlj 
+ (1 - fh)bOQ(r, + 7-d - Q*(r, + rdl + nr, + rdQ*cr3) 
+ fyr, + r,)(r - fh4Qu3) - Q*crdl} + (I - fTKPTKIQ(rl + zrd 
- Q*(rI + 2r.d 
Q”’ = Q*(r,) + (I - Pm)[Q*(T, + rd - Q’(TI)l 
+ (I - h)?[Q*(r, + x4) - Q*crl + rdi 
+ (I - h)yQcr, + 27-d - Qv, + x.4 
E = Expected number of tanks killed 
= 3P”’ + zp”’ + p”’ 
Exchange ratio = g 
8 
Fig. 10. Formulas: Three missiles versus uncoordinated tank platoon. 
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Probubiliry 
1st missile kills 1st tank but an in-flight round from 
the 1st tank kills the GLD. 
1st missile kills 1st tank and either the GLD is killed 
by 2nd tank before 2nd missile arrives or before 
the 3rd missile if the 2nd missile misses, or both 
the 2nd and 3rd missiles miss. 
1st missile misses but 2nd missile kills 1st tank and 
an in-flight round from the 1st tank kills the GLD. 
1st missile misses but 2nd missile kills 1st tank and 
either 2nd tank counterfire kills the GLD or the 
3rd missile misses. 
1st and 2nd missiles miss but the 3rd missile kills the 
1st tank. 
Pr,dQ(T,) - Q*cr1)1 
+ (I - Px)[Q*(7-, + ?-a) - Q*(TJ)I 
, 
+ P”(T, + T,)(l - PTKP) 
(I - PTKV’TK[Q(~I - l-4) - Q-(7-, + TA)] 
P(7-I + Td)(I - PxV’rdQ*(~3) 
+ P'(T3Ni - PLY)1 
, 
P*(T, + 27-,)(I - PTKVPTK 
Fig. Il. Disjoint events used to derive formula for P’“. 
Coordinated tank platoon 
On the other hand, suppose that the tank platoon is coordinated in the sense that upon 
laser alarm the designated tank alerts its companion tanks and they begin counterfire as 
well, after a time delay, Ts, required either to receive the information from the designated 
tank or to observe its reaction to recognition of the laser illumination (e.g., stopping, 
slewing of the turret). Since in practice T, > Ts, all tanks will have begun counterfiring 
at the GLD before the arrival of the first missile. The GLD is assumed to use the same 
designation strategy as in the case of the uncoordinated tank platoon, since it is of no 
benefit to switch targets until the kill is observed. The accuracy, and hence the SSKP, 
of the companion tank rounds will be assumed to be the same as the designated tank. 
In Fig. 12 the equations are presented for this case; derivations are again based on 
sums of disjoint events. The assumption that T4 2 TZ remains in effect for these formulas. 
PC3) = Prob (3 tanks killed) 
= P(r,)P(7-, + Tq - Ts)P*(T, + 27.4 - T>)E+K 
PC’) = Prob (exactly 2 tanks killed) 
= P(T,)[Q(T, + 7.4 - T5) - Q*(T, + T4 - Ts)]P*(T, + T, - T5)Pk 
+ P(T,)P(T, + Tq - Td[Q*(T, + 274 - Tj) - Q*(7', + 7'~ - Td]Ph 
+ P(T,)P(T, + T‘l - T5)P*(T, + 274 - Ts)P'nr(l - P,K) 
+ P(T,)[P*(T, + 2T4 - Td]'Pk(I - Pm) 
+ P(?-, + Td(P*(T, + 2T4 - Ts,]?(l - PTK)P& 
PC" = Prob (exactly one tank killed) 
= [Q(TI) - Q*(TI)I[P*(TI - T5)l'Pm 
+ P(T,H[P*(T, - T,)l’ - [P*(T! + T4 - T5)12)PTK 
+ P(T,){[P'(T, + T, - Ts)]2 - [P*(T, + 27, - TS)lZ}PTh.(l - Pm) 
+ P(T,)[P'(T, + 2T4 - Tj)IZPX(I - PTKY 
+ LQ(7.1 + T.t) - Q*(TI + TJ)I[P*(TI + T4 - r>)l”(l - PTKV’TK 
+ P(T, + Td{[P*(T, + 74 - T,)l’ 
Fig. 12. Formulas: three missiles versus coordinated tank platoon. 
Tank vs. anti-tank counterfire duel 
- [P*(T, - 
T 
27, - Tj)]_}( 1 - PTK)PTK 
- P(T, - 
, 3 
T,)[P’(T, - 2TJ - T!)l?I - PTK)‘PTh. 
- P’( T, t ZTa)[P’(T, - ZT, - T?)]‘( I - Prh-)‘PrK 
P”’ = Prob (no tanks killed) 
= 1 - P”(T,)[P’(T, - 7-511’ - (P*(TI)[P*(z- - Tdl’ 
- P’(T, i P,)[P*(T, + T4 - ?-!)]‘}(I - PT,y) 
- (P*(7-, 2. TA)[P’(T, - T, - ?-!,)I2 
- P”(T, + ZTd)[P’(T, A 27-, - T?)l’j(I - PTJ 
- P(T, + 2TA)[P”(T, L ZT, - T5)]‘(I - PTK? 
Q = Prob (CLD killed) 
= I - Prob (GLD not killed) 
= I - (P(T,)P(T, + Ta - Ts)f’(T, + ZT, - TIM% 
- P(T,)[P(T, + IT, - 7~)IZP,~~(I - Pm) 
+ P(7, + T,)[P(T, + 27, - T5)]‘(1 - Prh.)Pm 
+ P(T, + ZT,)[P(7, + 2T, - TcI]‘(l - /‘oh.)‘} 
Q”’ = P(T,)PTKP(T, + 7, - T,,P,,[Q(T, + 27, - T5) - Q’(TI + ZT, - TO]Prh. 
Q”’ = P(T,)P~~P~~~[Q(T, + T, - Tc) - Q*(T, + 7, - T~)lP*(T, + T, - Ts) 
+ P(7, + TJ - T>)[Q*(T, + ZT, - T,, - Q*(T, + Tq - Tj)I 
+ P(7, + i-4 - 75)(1 - f’r~)[Q(Tt + 2T, - 7.) - Q*(T, + 27, - 75)]} 
i P(T,)PTK(I - f’r~)f&P*(T, + ZT, - T1)1’ - [f(71 + 27, - T!)]‘} 
+ (I - PTh.)f’(T, + T,V’TKP~K{[P*(T, f ?TA - Tc)]’ - [P(T, + 2T, - T5)1’} 
Q”’ = PTK([Q(T,) - Q*(T,)I[P*(T, - Tc)l’ 
+ P(T,)([P*(T, - 7511’ - [P*(T, + 7, - T3)1’} 
+ P(T,)(I - P~K){[P*(T, + 7, - T5)l’ - [P*(T, + 274 - T,,l’} 
+ P(T,)(l - Pr,y)‘{[f*(7, + 2T, - Tc)]‘ - [P(T, + 274 - Tc)]‘}) 
+ (I - Prh.F’7h.([Q(T, + 7,) - Q”(T, + T,)I[P”(T, + T., - Ts)I’ 
+ P(T, + T,)([P*(T, + 7, - T,)]’ - [P*(T, + ZT, - 7c)]‘} 
+ P(T, + T,Kl - Px)([P*(T, + 2T., - Tc)]’ - [P(T, + 27; - 7,,]‘}, 
+ (I - P,,)‘P,,~P*(T, + ?T,)[P*(T, + ZT, - TI)]’ 
- P(T, + ZT,)[P(T, + 27, - T?)]-‘} 
Q”’ = I - P*(T,)[P*(T, - TT)]’ + (I - PTE;){P*(T,)[P*(T, - Ts,]’ 
- P*(T, + T,)[P*(T, + 7, - T5)]‘} 
+ (I - Pr,y)‘{P*(T, + TJ)[P*(T, i Ta - Tj)]’ 
- P*(T, + 2Td)[P”(T, + ZT, - Tj,]‘} 
+ (I - PrK)J{P*(T, + 2T,)[P(T, + 27, - Tc)l’ 
- P(T, + ZT,,[P(T, + ZT, - T5,]‘} 
E = Expected number of tanks killed 
= jp,3, + 7p121 + p”’ 
39 
Exchange ratio = E 
Q 
Fig. 12 
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The model has been developed thus far under the assumption that the tank round SSKP. 
PGK. remains constant for each fire. However, the tanker may be able to adjust his aim 
based on the result of his first fire and thus improve the SSKP for succeeding fires, or 
he may load a different round for subsequent fires from the one he was originally carrying 
in his main gun, or he may estimate the range to the GLD either visually or with a laser 
range finder and thus increase the accuracy and lethality of the rounds fired at the expense 
of a small time delay for ranging. All of these sophistications can be added to the above 
formulas with little difficulty. 
V. SAMPLE RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The tank counterfire duel models which have been presented were exercised for many 
combinations of parameters in order to provide the encounter outcomes for the SSTF 
force-on-force analysis. One way to graphically display the results of a counterfire duel 
is demonstrated in Fig. I3 which is based upon a sample set of input parameters. The 
graph shows the expected number of tanks killed (solid curves) and the probability of 
GLD kill (dashed curves) in a 3-on-3 encounter over a range of tank-to-GLD distances, 
with the GLD located in either a foxhole, a Forward Observer Vehicle or a bunker. 
These same results are represented in tabular form, for a particular intermediate tank- 
to-GLD range, in Table 2. The exchange ratios obtained in this sample calculation indicate 
that the foxhole position is the most survivable and effective GLD position, while the 
bunker is the least survivable to tank counterfire. No actual conclusions should be drawn 
from this sample calculation since these results are highly dependent on the choice of 
input parameters, such as the type of tank rounds fired, but this same line of reasoning 
would be used with actual data to draw survivability conclusions. 
Incorporating the counterfire duel methodology into the SSTF war game scenario pro- 
vided the data needed to determine whether or not the GLD is survivable on the battlefield. 
1.0 1.5 2.0 
TANK-TO-GLD RANGE (km) 
0.50 
0.40 x 
5 
z 
0.30 2 
c7 
l.L 
0 
0.20 z 
2 
5 
is 
0.10 B 
0 
0 
Figure 13. Sample counterfire duel results 
T
a
b
le
 
2
. 
S
a
m
p
le
 
T
a
b
u
la
r 
C
o
u
n
te
r-
fi
re
 D
u
e
l 
R
e
su
lt
s 
-I
 
E
 
7
7
 
Lz
 
T
a
n
k
- 
c,
 
to
-G
LD
 
z.
 
ra
n
g
e
 
G
LD
 
p(
O
) 
p(
l) 
I;
 
pm
 
p(
3)
 
E
 
($
0
) 
Q
(1
) 
Q
(2
) 
Q
(3
) 
Q
 
E
R
 
z-
 
(k
m
) 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
 
2
 
1
.5
 
Fo
x
h
o
le
 
0
.1
7
0
 
0
.4
0
9
 
0
.3
3
1
 
0
.0
9
0
 
1
.3
4
1
 
0
.0
0
2
 
0
.0
0
2
 
0
.0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
4
 
3
3
5
 
$
 
1
.5
 
B
u
n
ke
r 
0
.2
0
3
 
0
.4
0
5
 
0
.3
0
8
 
0
.0
8
4
 
1
.2
7
3
 
0
.0
5
8
 
0
.0
4
3
 
0
.0
0
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 
0
.1
0
8
 
1
2
 
; 
1
.5
 
FO
V
 
0
.1
7
6
 
0
.4
0
9
 
0
.3
2
7
 
0
.0
8
8
 
1
.3
2
7
 
0
.0
1
4
 
0
.0
1
0
 
0
.0
0
2
 
0
.0
0
0
 
0
.0
2
6
 
5
1
 
- 
12 JOSEPH V. IM~~~.~~~~~~~ 
Due to classification, the conclusion of the SSTF analysis cannot be presented in this 
paper. However, it should be mentioned that the counterfire duel methodology was also 
very useful in testing the sensitivity of the SSTF conclusions to variations in the many 
input parameters required in the study-such as type of tank rounds fired, motion of tank, 
handoff time between tanks, designation mode, slope at GLD position, and laser-guided 
weapon rate of fire-to determine which were critical. Such sensitivity analyses are often 
instrumental in the development of weapon system improvements. 
It is anticipated that the analytic model presented in this paper is sufficiently general 
to have applications to many types of duel encounters where response time is the critical 
factor. We hope that the reader will find the model useful in such situations; further details 
can be obtained from the author. 
